

# Analysis of the policy context addressing 25+ NEETs

COUNTRY REPORT – HUNGARY

*Katalin Bördős, Eszter Szőnyi, Luca Koltai (HÉTFA Research Institute)*

2022

**IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE PROJECT ‘LOST  
MILLENNIALS – TRANSNATIONAL RESEARCH  
NETWORK FOR THE EVALUATION OF INITIATIVES  
TARGETING 25+ NEETS’**

*Please cite as: Bördős, K., Szőnyi, E., Koltai, L. (2022) Analysis of the Policy Context Addressing 25+ NEETs. Country Report – Hungary. HÉTFA Research Institute. Lost Millennials – Transnational Research Network for the Evaluation of Initiatives Targeting 25+ NEETs. Available at <https://lostmillennials.eu>*

Project summary:

*The project ‘Lost Millennials’ focuses on a regularly neglected group of the generation of Millennials: young people aged 25-29 neither in employment or education and training (25+ NEETs). This generation started their working life shortly after the economic crisis of 2008, perceiving uncertainty and lack of security for work and well-being, they are more likely to be inactive or in precarious jobs. The main objective of the project is to contribute to the successful integration of 25+ NEETs to the labour market through increasing knowledge on the effects of employment initiatives on 25+ NEETs, building capacity of stakeholders to perform impact studies and thus improving the quality of labour market interventions. This objective will be achieved through the creation of the transnational research network which will share know-how and good practices, the evaluations of governmental and community-based initiatives targeting 25+ NEETs, as well as the engagement of stakeholders to increase the policy-relevance of project results.*

For more information, please visit our [website](#), contact us on [lm.leadpartner@hetfa.hu](mailto:lm.leadpartner@hetfa.hu) and follow our social media ([Facebook](#), [LinkedIn](#)).

*The Lost Millennials project is funded by Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway through the EEA and Norway Grants Fund for Youth Employment.*

Implemented by:



## Table of Contents

---

<b>1. Introduction .....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>2. Overall policy context .....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>3. Institutional framework.....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>4. Supply-side policies .....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>4.1 Education and qualification .....</b>	<b>4</b>
4.1.1 Compulsory education .....	4
4.1.2 Vocational Education Training .....	6
4.1.3 Higher education.....	7
<b>4.2 Labour market policies .....</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>4.3 Entrepreneurship .....</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>4.4 Work-life reconciliation policies.....</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>4.5 Health/ Social Insurance policies .....</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>5. Demand-side policies.....</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>5.1 Incentives.....</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>5.2 Social security policies .....</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>5.3 Taxes.....</b>	<b>18</b>
<b>6. Orientation.....</b>	<b>18</b>
<b>7. Conclusions .....</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>8. References .....</b>	<b>21</b>

## 1. Introduction

---

NEET-rates in Hungary are not outstandingly high: for 15-24-year-olds, NEET-rates correspond to the EU-27 average (in 2021, it was 10.6% and 10.8% for Hungary and the EU-27, respectively<sup>1</sup>), and for the 25-29 cohort, it is even below the average of the Member States (13.4% for Hungary and 17.3% in the EU-27 for 2021). However, if we have a closer look at the situation of NEETs, we can see that certain groups – especially women, those with a low level of educational attainment and those who belong to the Roma minority – are in a significantly worse position than the ‘average’ youth in Hungary: for example, the gender gap concerning the 25+ NEET-rate was 17.9 percentage points in 2020, and the vast majority (84%) of NEET women were outside the labour force. Among those with the lowest levels of education, the 25+ NEET-rate in 2020 (49%) was almost 3 times higher than among those with an upper secondary degree (17%) and almost 4.5 times higher than among those with tertiary education (11.1%). Also, Roma people have a higher risk of poverty and social exclusion, their employment rate is lower and they complete fewer grades of school on average compared with non-Roma Hungarian citizens.

The different fields of public policy have the potential to improve the situation of NEETs and to enable youth to integrate into the labour market. In this report, we take stock of the different legislations and regulations in effect in Hungary that can potentially affect the situation of (25+) NEETs. Wherever it is available, we summarise the results of the relevant impact evaluations as well.

## 2. Overall policy context

---

Concerning 25+ NEETs, the most relevant fields of policy in Hungary are youth policy, employment policy, education policy (especially vocational adult training and higher education) and social policy.

The Office for the Deputy Secretary of State for Youth Affairs (currently) belongs under the Minister heading the Prime Minister's Office (Miniszterelnökség); before 2022, the Office was assigned under the Minister without Portfolio Responsible for Families (Családokért Felelős Tárcá Nélküli Miniszter). It is responsible for general **youth policy**, including the monitoring of the National Youth Strategy and the Future for the New Generation Programme.

**Employment policy** is the responsibility of the Office for the Secretary of State for Employment. It operated under the Ministry of Finance (Pénzügyminisztérium) until 2020, when it was moved under the umbrella of the Ministry for Innovation and Technology (Innovációs és Technológiai Minisztérium). The Office is responsible for the preparation of legislative proposals concerning employment policy,

---

<sup>1</sup> Based on Eurostat data (edat\_lfse\_20).

designing and monitoring of active labour market programmes (ALMPs) and tracking employment trends. It also monitors the operations of the National Employment Service, which is responsible for the registration of jobseekers, the administration of jobseekers' benefits and the implementation of ALMPs.

Even though considered as an employment policy measure and operated by the National Employment Service, **public works schemes** are the responsibility of the Deputy State Secretary for Public Works Schemes and Water Management, which is under the umbrella of the Ministry of Interior (Belügyminisztérium).

The Office for the Secretary of State for Higher Education, Innovation and Vocational Training is a department in the Ministry for Innovation and Technology. Among others, its tasks include the supervision of **vocational and adult training and higher education** and policy-making in related fields. **General education policy** belongs under the Secretary of State for Public Education, in the Ministry of Human Capacities (Emberi Erőforrások Minisztériuma, EMMI).

The fields of **social policy** and **social inclusion** belong to the Secretary of State for Social Affairs (under the Ministry of Human Capacities [Emberi Erőforrások Minisztériuma, EMMI]) and the Deputy Secretary of State for Social Inclusion (under the Ministry of Interior [Belügyminisztérium, BM]), respectively. The former is responsible for social development policies, social services, disability services and the child protection system; the latter coordinates policies in the area of social inclusion, including supervising the implementation of the Hungarian National Social Inclusion Strategy 2030.

Note that this report was prepared during April and the first half of May, 2022. After the re-election of the government in April, 2022, rearrangement of tasks and responsibilities between the different ministries (as well as setting up new ministries and dissolving existing ones) has already been announced in mid-May.

### 3. Institutional framework

---

Hungary is a unitary country with a two-tier subnational government system: there are 20 NUTS-3 level regions in Hungary (19 counties plus the capital city area) and 3,155 settlements. Both the counties and the municipalities are governed by councils composed of representatives elected for 5 years. Hungary's governance is highly centralised. The duties of the municipalities (e.g., maintenance of public spaces, local public transport, land-use planning, primary healthcare, child protection support etc.) are prescribed in the Act CLXXXIX of 2011 on Local Governments. There is no NUTS-2 level governance in Hungary; the NUTS-2 level regions are defined only for planning and statistical purposes.

Policies for employment, education and social inclusion are mainly designed on the national level by different ministries/secretaries of state (see Section 2). However, several background institutions that belong under the governance of ministries have NUTS-3 level offices, which may have further decentralised units (on NUTS-4 level small regions or on municipal level) that are responsible for the implementation of policies. For example, the National Employment Service (which belongs under the Secretary of State for Employment – Ministry for Innovation and Technology) have 20 county-level Employment Centres (operating within the institutional framework of the county-level government offices) and 178 NUTS-4 level branch offices (jobcentres) that are responsible for registering jobseekers, service delivery and the administration of benefits. County-level employment centres supervise and coordinate the operations of the jobcentres and decide on resource allocation among them.

Education policy is also designed centrally (with the responsible entity being the Ministry of Human Capacities in case of general education and the Ministry for Innovation and Technology for vocational education). Public schools are maintained by the central state (since 2013; before that, they were operated by the local governments): the Klebelsberg Centre is a background institution that is responsible for operating schools. The Klebelsberg Centre consists of 60 educational district centres that are responsible for the management and monitoring of schools operating in their territory, decides on school budgets, appoints and dismisses teachers, organises entrance exams etc.

Local governments are responsible for the operations of kindergartens and nurseries. Although the main social benefits (for people suffering from health problems or taking care of a child and are therefore unable to work) is set and paid centrally (via the government offices), municipalities can discretionally decide on additional benefits for local citizens in need.

## 4. Supply-side policies

---

### 4.1 Education and qualification

#### 4.1.1 Compulsory education

Despite anti-segregation laws (Act CXXV of 2003 on Equal Treatment and Promoting Equality of Chances), **Hungary's education system** is highly selective and often considered **inequitable** by experts (see, for example, Aue et al., 2020; European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice, 2020; Horn et al., 2016; Kertesi & Kézdi, 2014; Radó, 2020; World Bank, 2015; specifically on the segregation of Roma, see Kovács, 2016). Early tracking and free school selection often result in social and ethnic segregation of students. A common method for segregating Roma students is to assess them as 'special needs students' and assign them to special schools or classes, separating them from non-Roma children. The main problem with the Hungarian education system is thus the lack of access to *quality* education.

Based on the Act CXC of 2011 on Public Education, a ‘potential early drop-out student’ is a student whose overall grade average is below mediocre or whose grade average decreased by more than 1.1 grades (on a five-grade scale) since previous year. The regulation prescribes some measures that aim to monitor early school leavers: schools are obliged to collect data for indicators of early school leaving and try to prevent students from dropping out.

**Study halls (tanoda)** are established and are maintained by NGOs. Study halls provide extra-curricular afternoon lessons and tutoring for mainly disadvantaged students. One of the main goals of study halls is to prevent early school leaving. They also provide various non-formal learning and community-building activities for students (and their families). Although no counterfactual impact evaluations have been carried out, study halls are generally praised for their potential in reducing the chance of early school leaving. Based on some research papers that rely on surveys and interviews conducted among study hall students, parents, and teachers in study halls (referenced in Bihari, 2021), the main strength of study halls is that they help pupils understand the study material better, enhance their basic competences, and increase their self-confidence and motivation for learning (and sometimes for further studies). The main problem with study halls is the lack of (predictable) funding: they are mostly funded via EU grants, and this makes long-term planning for their operations difficult (Bihari, 2021). The operations of study halls are regulated by the 40/2018. (XII. 4.) EMMI Decree.

The **mandatory school-leaving age** was decreased from 18 to 16 in 2012. Hermann (2020a) evaluated the impacts of this regulation change on the drop-out rate by using individual-level administrative data on school enrolments. Based on his estimations, lowering the school-leaving age increased the share of youths not attending school, particularly in the 16–18 age group. This, however, did not seem to coincide with a substantial decrease in the proportion of students acquiring an upper-secondary qualification, since most pupils who dropped out below the age of 18 as a result of the intervention would have dropped out when reaching the age of 18, even if compulsory school-leaving age had remained unchanged. Note that those who dropped out of school soon after the legislative change in 2012 at the age of 16-17 belong to the 25-29 age category in 2022.

With the reform of the VET system (see in section 4.1.2), the so-called **Stepping programme (Dobbantó program)** was introduced for persons above 16 years of age who have not completed primary education and aims to promote re-entrance to the education system. This one-year programme focuses on basic competence development and career orientation. After the completion of the Stepping Programme, adults need to complete the so-called ‘Workshop’ which provides them with partial vocation as well as a certificate for completion of primary education. Although this programme does not have a more specific target group, it is typical that those attending (usually adults) are of disadvantaged background. NEETs or 25+ NEETs are not targeted specifically.

### 4.1.2 Vocational Education Training

The VET 4.0 – Medium-term strategy for the renewal of vocational education and training and adult education (2019-2030) was introduced in line with Act LXXX of 2019 on Vocational Education, and was approved by Government Decree 1168/2019. (III.28). It aims to transform the Hungarian VET and adult education system responding to the main challenges of the previous system in place (which has also undergone many changes since 2010). The VET system is separated from public education, both in legislation and considering the responsible authorities. School-based vocational trainings are provided in two types of secondary schools:

- **Technical schools (technikum)** provide 5-year trainings, with a vocational qualification and secondary educational attainment (school leaving exams (*érettségi*) in general subject (literature, history, etc.)) which overall enables students to continue studies in tertiary education;
- **Vocational training schools (szakképző iskola)** provide 3-year trainings, providing a vocational certificate (not the same as in technical schools), with a potential to acquire vocational and/or secondary qualifications by attending an additional training course after completion of the training.

The increasing demand for skilled labour with high-quality professional knowledge has led the Hungarian government towards introducing a **dual approach in the vocational education system** (as well as in higher education) in the first half of the 2010s. The intent was to make vocational education more practice-based and to involve employers in the training process. The good example that served as a role model was the German (and, in a somewhat lesser extent, the Danish) education system. In this dual system, vocational education takes place in parallel at the school and at firms. Apprentices are entitled to a salary: it is set as 60-100% of the statutory minimum wage (Act LXXX of 2019 on Vocational Education). Both types of VET schools described above, provide dual training system to allow students to gain work experience (and income).

The current system of lower-secondary vocational training schools **is often criticised**: it is a common belief that the quality of training is often questionable in these schools, and the much lower wages (even on the long-run) of lower-secondary vocational training school graduates (compared with the earnings of higher-secondary technical school graduates with a degree) seem to affirm these beliefs (see, for example, Köllő 2018). Students in lower-secondary vocational training schools often lack basic literacy and/or numeracy skills, which hinders their professional trainings as well (Hermann, 2020b; Hermann et al., 2020). By comparison, in the German or in the Scandinavian dual training systems – which served as role models for the introduction of the dual training system introduced in Hungary –, pupils receive general education (in mathematics, physics, reading, computer skills, languages etc.) in a much higher number of hours than in Hungary before starting their vocational training, and therefore graduates are



able to perform more complex jobs or can enter further education (Kölló, 2018). More specifically, while in technical schools, students have general subjects to some extent, in vocational training schools, the focus is nearly exclusively on vocational subjects.

### 4.1.3 Higher education

Promoting universal access to higher education is intended via scholarship programmes and student loans. Also, disadvantaged student applicants (as well as disabled applicants and mothers with young children) receive **extra points** during university admissions (423/2012. [XII. 29.] Government Decree).

The current system of **student loan** was introduced in 2001 within the framework of the Higher Education Development Programme, which was part of a loan agreement between Hungary and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). All students enrolled in tertiary education under the age of 45 can apply for a student loan without risk assessment or proof of leverage. There are two types of student loans: type 1 with a freely disposable loan paid to the student and type 2 (which was introduced in 2012 when the number of state-financed scholarship student places in higher education was cut drastically) that covers tuition fees and is paid directly to the educational institution. The amount of the freely disposable loan is a maximum of HUF 150,000 (approx. EUR 395<sup>2</sup>) per month for the period of the studies (maximum 11 semesters). Repayment starts after the end of the studies, depending on the grantee's income. The interest rate is subsidised by the state, the grantee has to pay 1.99%. The relevant regulation on student loans is the 1/2012 (I.20.) Government Decree.

There are various **state scholarships** for students awarded either on merit, financial/disadvantaged status or both. The most common type is the state-financed scholarship that covers tuition fees: although the number of places was cut back in 2012 drastically, as of 2022 still, the majority of students pay no tuition fee (the share of students paying no fees at all depends on the field of study). Other scholarships that cover living expenses are mostly available for students coming from disadvantaged backgrounds. For more details, see the Act CCIV of 2011 on Higher Education.

Even with the extra points system, scholarships and student loan programmes, **equality of chances is not achieved in higher education**. For example, in 2017, the share of Roma students aged 15-24 in higher education was 0.8%, while among the non-Roma, it was 19.3% (Papp, 2021). The underlying reasons are manifold, but one root of the problem is that early school leaving in secondary education is much more prevalent among disadvantaged Roma compared with non-Roma students (65.3% vs. 12.5%; Papp, 2021), thus many of the Roma youth do not get to higher education, either.

---

<sup>2</sup> For the amounts in EUR, we used an exchange rate of 354 HUF/EUR, valid in February 2022.

## 4.2 Labour market policies

Labour market policies cover active labour market policies (ALMPs) and passive policies (benefits for jobseekers). With the exception of public works schemes, ALMPs in Hungary are usually large-scale programmes (co-)financed by EU grants, such as the GINOP/EDIOP<sup>3</sup> 5.1.1 (Road to Work), the GINOP 5.2.1 (Youth Guarantee<sup>4</sup>), GINOP 6.1.1 (Trainings for jobseekers with a low level of educational attainment and public workers), GINOP 5.3.10 (Preventing and tackling mass lay-offs), GINOP 5.3.13 (Trainings, scholarships and re-employment support of parents raising young children) or the GINOP 5.1.5 (Supporting Labour Market Service Delivery by Non-governmental Organisations). The main measures of these programmes are as follows:

- labour market trainings,
- wage subsidies or wage cost subsidies (covered under Section 4.7, 'Incentives'),
- start-up subsidies (covered under the Section 4.3, 'Entrepreneurship'),
- travel subsidies (for commuting to work or trainings), and
- labour market services (covered under Section 6, 'Orientation').

**Labour market trainings** are covered by the Employment Act (Act IV of 1991 on Employment Promotion and Jobseekers' Allowances) and the 311/2021. (VI. 7.) Government Decree. Labour market trainings are offered for registered jobseekers, and it is the National Employment Service that organises the trainings. The target group depends on the specifics of the programme under which the training is provided, but basically any registered jobseeker can be involved in trainings. Based on statistics of the National Employment Services, young people under 30 are more likely to participate in trainings compared with older jobseekers.

The National Employment Service regularly monitors the job postings and future recruitment needs of firms in each of the counties, and tries to adjust the local training catalogue offered for jobseekers accordingly. The trainings are provided by private or state-managed institutions. There are various types of trainings offered at the National Employment Service, including:

---

<sup>3</sup> The Economic Development and Innovation Operational Programme (EDIOP; in Hungarian: Gazdaságfejlesztési Operatív Program, GINOP) includes programmes funded by the ESF and ERDF. Among others, the main priorities are increasing the competitiveness and productivity of SMEs, promoting research technological development and innovation and also to enhance employability of the labour force in Hungary. Active labour market programmes belong under priority axes 5 ('Employment') and 6 ('Competitive workforce').

<sup>4</sup> The Youth Guarantee in Hungary targeted 15-25-year-olds until 2022, therefore it could not reach 25+ NEETs, and it was excluded from this analysis.

- trainings aiming at providing a vocational qualification: these are the most common types of training. Trainings of this type can last from 0.5 years to 2 years and a vocational qualification of ISCED level 3C-5A can be achieved at the end of the training;
- trainings for acquiring a driving licence (for cars or for work vehicles);
- trainings for finishing the last two grades of primary education (for those who have unfinished studies);
- trainings for the development of basic competences; or
- language courses.

The **employment impact of labour market trainings** in Hungary has been evaluated a number of times. Most of these evaluations focus on a specific target group and a limited period (i.e., a few years). In the last few years, two counterfactual impact evaluations (Adamecz-Völgyi et al., 2018; Strategopolis, 2018) were conducted on training programmes; both of them used administrative data of the National Employment Service (Adamecz-Völgyi et al. between 2010-2014 and Strategopolis between 2009-2017) and relied on propensity score matching techniques. Both evaluations concluded that training programmes successfully improve the employment chances of participants and reduced the probability of unemployment. The effects were stronger for those with a lower level of educational attainment (those without an upper secondary degree).

Labour market trainings thus prove to be effective tools for improving the employability of participants, though they are not devoid of weaknesses. Based on the report of Strategopolis (2018), **cream-skimming** is quite common in training programmes: jobseekers with less disadvantaged backgrounds (more educated, more experienced, those living in relatively more developed regions etc.) are more likely to get involved in trainings than those who are more vulnerable. The analysis made by Adamecz-Völgyi et al. (2018) agrees with Strategopolis's statement on cream-skimming (and the same was found by Bördős et al., 2018; Bördős & Petróczi, 2019; and World Bank, 2018 as well), although they note that the extent of creaming has decreased by the end of the 2010s, thus the targeting of trainings has improved (though it can be explained by the change in composition of jobseekers in general). The reports of Strategopolis (2018) and Bördős et al. (2018) also note that the choice on the palette of trainings is not always driven by the demand of the local labour market; instead, they are often selected based on the interests and capacities of local training providers.

The most commonly offered measure for long-term unemployed is **public works schemes** (direct job creation schemes). Although young jobseekers below 25 and new entrants to the labour market are not the main target group of public works schemes, they can be participants nevertheless.

Public works programmes have existed since the 1980s, but the first major expansion have occurred in 2009 via the 'Road to Work' programme<sup>5</sup>. This expansion ensued in response to the rising levels of unemployment due to the economic crisis. After the change in government in 2010, public works schemes have gained even more ground, and the number of participants has grown substantially. Meanwhile, the social welfare system underwent a substantial change, and the public works wage (and the employment substitution benefit, which prescribed participation in a public works-type employment as an eligibility rule<sup>6</sup>) basically became the only available income for most long-term unemployed. The number of participants peaked in 2015 at 224.9 thousand – this accounted for about 5.4% of total employment. Since 2016, a constant decrease can be observed due to the growing demand and pressure on the primary labour market, but public works have remained an important tool for employment policy nevertheless.

Public works programmes provide basically the only source of income for a large number of disadvantaged jobseekers (long-term unemployed, those having a low level of educational attainment and/or living in peripheral regions). With no other alternative benefits for able-bodied persons, public works schemes have thus activated a substantial share of previously inactive persons. Despite this, public works are subject to criticism by many employment policy experts. The work contract for public workers is for a limited 1-year period but is usually renewed annually: many of them have been engaged in public works for several years without interruption. Despite this, public workers earn less than the statutory minimum wage: their wage is set by the law and (depending on the year) measures up to about 50-60% of the minimum wage. In addition, some research show that public works programmes have a lock-in effect of considerable size. The papers of Bakó et al. (2014) and Bakó & Molnár (2016) analysed National Employment Service data from 2010-2014, and showed that exit to employment in the primary labour market was only 6-7% 30 days after finishing a public works programme (and 8-9% after 90 days). Although the economic boom in the second half of the 2010s has probably helped the re-employment chances of ex-public workers, in 2018, it was hypothesised that this lock-in effect was still quite strong: based on Koltai et al. (2018), it was estimated to be about 60%.

For young jobseekers, long-standing participation in public works programmes can cause scarring effects on future career prospects due to the strong lock-in effects; also, public workers tend to be more vulnerable (they earn less, have a temporary contract and mostly perform low-skill jobs) in comparison with those working in the primary labour market. Socialising into a job less demanding (as is usually the

---

<sup>5</sup> Though the names sound similar, this 'Road to Work' programme (launched in 2009) was a different one to the 'Road to Work' complex ALMP starting in 2015.

<sup>6</sup> Eligibility for the employment substitution benefit requires engagement in employment or in public works programmes for at least 30 days in every year, or participation in an ALMP. In practice, only public works schemes are a real option in most disadvantaged regions.

case with public works) also hinders employability on the long run. There are also some evidence (Bördös & Petróczi, 2019; Molnár, 2020; Sánta, 2016) that suggest that a not insignificant number of youths below 20 years – especially those with disadvantaged backgrounds – drops out of secondary education in order to participate in a public works programme, especially in disadvantaged regions.

Concerning **passive labour market policies**, there are two major benefit types for registered jobseekers in Hungary:

- The **jobseekers' benefit** (álláskeresési járadék) is based on the compulsory social insurance scheme. The benefit amounts to 60% of the beneficiary's earlier average earnings; there is a fixed maximum amount which equals to the minimum wage (HUF 167,400 [EUR 477]). The maximum duration of the benefit is 90 days. Eligibility for jobseekers' benefit requires having at least 360 days of insurance (i.e., work experience) during the previous 3 years. Recipients are obliged to cooperate with the National Employment Service: that is, they must accept the job or participation in ALMPs offered by the NES.
- The **employment substituting benefit** (foglalkoztatást helyettesítő támogatás) is a tax-financed, means-tested, minimum income-type benefit. It targets active-age people who are able to work but are not employed and are not in education, and who do not have sufficient resources of living (i.e., the monthly income per consumption unit does not exceed 90% of the minimum of the old-age pension). The benefit has a fixed amount equal to 80% of the minimum old-age pension (HUF 22,800 [€65]) per month. Recipients are obliged to cooperate with the National Employment Service and need to either
  - engage in employment or a public works scheme for at least 30 days in the given year, or
  - participate in an ALMP

in order to remain eligible for the benefit.

The applicable statutory basis is Act IV of 1991 on Promoting Employment and Providing for the Unemployed in the case of jobseekers' benefit and Act III of 1993 on Social Administration and Social Benefits.

There is some anecdotal evidence (see, for example, Bördös & Petróczi, 2019) that a substantial number of unemployed **youths do not register as jobseekers** at the public employment services, as they do not have a financial incentive to do so. Due to the required 360 days of insurance, young jobseekers without a sufficient level of previous job records are not eligible. If they are not eligible to the employment substituting benefit either (which is often the case, especially if they still live with their parents: since only one member of a given family can be eligible to this benefit, it is usually one of the parents who receives it), young people do not have any financial incentives at all to register as jobseekers. A recent

study (Csillag et al., 2020) also proves that the National Employment Service is not very successful in reaching disadvantaged youths, and they are often left out of most ALMPs as a result.

The maximum duration of jobseekers' benefit was cut back in 2011 from 270 to 90 days. This reduction has been subject to heavy criticism ever since, as no other developed country has a jobseekers' benefit duration this short. Data from the National Employment Service shows that in March 2022, more than 41% of registered jobseekers received no benefits at all, and the average length of registration was 477 days<sup>7</sup>, highly exceeding the duration of the benefit. Based on this, a referendum on reinstalling the maximum duration of jobseekers' benefit to 270 days was initiated in 2021.

### 4.3 Entrepreneurship

**Start-up subsidies** are available for jobseekers who have been registered for at least 1 month. Participants receive non-refundable financial support as well as mentoring and training for starting a new business. A one-time grant for capital investments (to the extent of 15 times the minimum wage at most) as well as self-employment for 6 months (to the extent of the minimum wage) are covered. Participants must operate the business for a further 18 months at least, otherwise the grant has to be paid back. The subsidy is regulated under the 100/2021. (II. 27.) Government Decree.

The impact of the policy has not been evaluated so far. Based on a recent analysis of data from the National Employment Service (Bördös & Petróczi, 2019), start-up subsidies have only become more popular in the last few years of the 2010s, and young jobseekers below 25 only sporadically receive this type of subsidy. There is a start-up subsidy programme launched in 2018 that specifically targets young people under 30 (GINOP 5.2.7 – Promoting entrepreneurship among youth).

### 4.4 Work-life reconciliation policies

**Maternity leave for mothers** takes 24 weeks, during which a social insurance-based benefit called infant-care allowance (csecsemőgondozási díj, CSED) is available for those with sufficient previous employment records. The amount of the benefit is 100% of previous gross earnings as of July 2021 (before that, it was 70% of previous earnings). No paid work (not even part-time) is permitted during maternity leave without losing eligibility to infant-care allowance. After 24 weeks, insured parents<sup>8</sup> are entitled to a benefit called **child-care benefit** (gyermekgondozási díj, GYED), paid until the 2nd birthday of the child. The benefit imposes no limitations on working and sums up to 70% of previous earnings (however, there

---

<sup>7</sup> [https://nfsz.munka.hu/nfsz/document/2/0/8/0/doc\\_url/Havi\\_reszletes\\_adatok\\_2022\\_marcius.pdf](https://nfsz.munka.hu/nfsz/document/2/0/8/0/doc_url/Havi_reszletes_adatok_2022_marcius.pdf) Date of download: 21 April, 2022.

<sup>8</sup> GYED can be claimed by either the mother or the father (and in some cases, the grandmother) of the child, although it is usually mothers who take up this benefit (only about 10% of all claimants are male).

is a maximum amount). These benefits are regulated by the Act LXXXIII of 1997 on the Benefits of Compulsory Health Insurance.

For those not covered by social insurance (those without a job record of at least 365 days during the last two years before delivery) and for those who have exhausted the child-care benefit, a flat-rate, universal benefit is available, received until the 3rd birthday of the child. This is called **child-care allowance** (gyermekgondozást segítő ellátás, GYES) and sums up to about 80 EUR per month and has been constant since 2008. The benefit is covered by the Act LXXXIV of 1998 on Family Support.

Szabó-Morvai (2013) estimated the impact of child-care benefit on maternal labour supply using microdata from the Hungarian Labour Force Survey. The benefit was (re-)introduced in 2000, allowing the researcher to exploit this natural experiment and apply a difference-and-differences methodology. Her results indicate that receiving child-care benefit does not cause significant drops in employment in the first two years of motherhood; however, after the second year, a negative employment impact was found for women with low levels of educational attainment (contrary to the fact that child-care benefit can only be claimed for two years). This was explained by the wealth effect of the cash benefit: the accumulated monetary reserves allowed mothers to choose staying at home instead of undertaking a full-time job.

**Fathers** are entitled to 5 days of paid leave in case of the birth of a child.

The Act I of 2012 on the Labour Code (§ 61.) prescribes **that employers are obliged to agree to part-time employment** (20 hours/week) of parents of children aged less than 4 (in case of three or more children, until the 6<sup>th</sup> birthday of the youngest child) when requested. According to this legislation, wages and salaries must not be lower than 50% of previous (full-time) wages and salaries.

In-kind benefits include nurseries and kindergartens. **Nurseries** usually accept children from age 0.5-1 year to 3 years and can be run by both local governments and the private sector. In the recent 10-15 years, demand for nurseries has been constantly growing (mainly due to increasing maternal employment), but availability and capacities highly vary across regions, with serious over-demand in some parts of the country. In 2020, about 75% of all settlements in Hungary had no nurseries at all, affecting about 21% of children of the relevant age (KSH, 2020a). In 2019, the government announced a large-scale programme for the expansion of nursery capacities.

**Kindergartens** accept children from age 3 (or 2.5 in some cases); since 2015, kindergarten is compulsory for children older than 3 years<sup>9</sup>. In 2019, 92% of children aged 3-5 years old attended kindergarten (KSH,

---

<sup>9</sup> More precisely, a child is required to start attending kindergarten from 1 September in a given year if they turn 3 before 31 August. Exceptions can be made on the basis of health/child development issues.

2020b). Apart from occasional and sporadic cases, capacities tend to be sufficient everywhere. Most kindergartens are maintained by local governments and there is no tuition fee; meals are subsidised and are offered at a reduced fee, and they are free of charge for families with financial difficulties.

## 4.5 Health/ Social Insurance policies

Up until the second half of the 2000s, **the disability benefit system** was considered quite generous in Hungary. For this reason, a considerable number of people ‘escaped’ into this scheme from unemployment during the recession of the 1990s, and the number of recipients amounted to 12% of the working-age population in 2003 (Krekó & Scharle, 2021a). The intent to cut back on the costs of the system and activate those who are able to work led to reforms first in 2008 and then in 2012, when larger emphasis was placed on rehabilitation services, benefit amounts were cut and assessment for eligibility became much stricter. As a consequence, the number of disability and rehabilitation benefit recipients fell dramatically (by more than 60%) between 2003 and 2019. Currently, there are two kinds of disability benefits: the rehabilitation benefit is entitled for a person who is capable of rehabilitation for work, while disability benefit is for people whose rehabilitation is not recommended or is unlikely to be successful, or if the person reaches retirement age in less than 5 years (see the Act CXCI of 2011 on Benefits for Persons with Reduced Working Capacity and Amendments of Certain Acts).

In the case of **rehabilitation benefit**, eligibility is set for at most 36 months, and the recipient has to cooperate with the rehabilitation authority; rehabilitation includes medical and social rehabilitation, training and employment-related activities. The amount of the rehabilitation benefit is 35% or 45% of previous average earnings (depending on the intensity of the rehabilitation needs).

Entitlement to **disability benefit** is permanent, and the amount sums up to 40-70% of previous earnings (depending on state of health).

Assessment for rehabilitation and disability benefit has become rather strict since 2012. Eligibility for the benefit depends on an assessment of health status by a rehabilitation committee: one is entitled to the benefits if their health status is of 60% or below. Another requirement for the benefits is sufficient length of previous social security insurance (i.e., work experience). Those receiving a disability or rehabilitation benefit cannot be registered as jobseekers (therefore, cannot be involved in most active labour market measures); and rehabilitation benefit recipients have an obligation to cooperate with the rehabilitation authority.

Another element of disability policy is the obligatory ‘**rehabilitation quota**’ in effect for employers: it is mandatory for each employer with 25 or more employees to fill at least 5% of all posts with employees with disability. If this obligation is not met, the employer must pay additional taxes (a contribution to the rehabilitation sub-fund of the central budget). The amount of this contribution is the ninefold of the



minimum wage. The employment effects of this disability employment quota were evaluated by Krekó & Scharle (2021b) using a regression discontinuity design. Based on their estimations, employers with headcounts just over the threshold of 25 had significantly and considerably more disabled employees (about 0.6) on average than those below it (about 0.3) in 2012. However, the number of disabled employees is far below the obligatory employment quota even at firms above the threshold, despite the very strong financial incentives. The authors estimate that that the majority of the quota (about 65–70 per cent) is still unfilled.

## 5. Demand-side policies

---

### 5.1 Incentives

The regulation on wage subsidies (incentives for employers hiring workers of specific groups) is covered by the Employment Act (Act IV of 1991 on Employment Promotion and Jobseekers' Allowances) and the 100/2021. (II. 27.) Government Decree. Based on these legislations, disadvantaged or severely disadvantaged jobseekers as well as new entrants to the labour market can be hired with wage subsidies or wage cost subsidies. **Disadvantaged jobseekers** are defined as follows:

- having at most primary level of educational attainment (completed 8 grades of schooling or less);
- below 25 years old or above 50 years old;
- registered jobseekers for at least 6 months;
- single parents with dependant(s);
- parents of young children (those who received parental benefits in the previous 12 months);
- new entrants to the labour market (those who finished their education in the previous 2 years and do not have previous employment records; this applies to those below 30 years of age in case of tertiary education and those below 25 in case of secondary education or below); or
- have been incarcerated in the previous 12 months.

A **severely disadvantaged jobseeker** is someone who is a

- disadvantaged jobseeker and is long-term unemployed (has been a registered jobseeker for at least 12 months); or
- has been a registered jobseeker for at least 24 months.

The maximum length of a wage subsidy is 12 months for disadvantaged jobseekers and 24 months for severely disadvantaged jobseekers. The amount of the wage subsidy covers 50% of wage costs. Wage cost subsidies can only be applied as part of a (mostly EU-funded, complex) ALMP and can cover up to 100% of wage costs; in practice, almost all subsidies are wage cost subsidies and are financed via ESF.

**New entrants to the labour market** are persons younger than 25 (in case of primary or secondary level of educational attainment) or younger than 30 (in case of tertiary level of educational attainment) who have less than 180 days of previous work experience.

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, wage subsidies were gradually extended to further groups of jobseekers:

- youth below 25 years old (from October 2020);
- those working in the tourism sector (from November 2020);
- every registered jobseeker registered for at least 1 month (from June 2021);
- youth below 30 who acquired their vocational degree since 2011; the supported employment must be in an occupation according to the vocational degree (from November 2021).

These new subsidies are financed through the GINOP 5.1.1 and GINOP 5.2.1 labour market programmes.

As response to the war in Ukraine, a new subsidy programme was launched at the end of February, 2022. This scheme supports employers who employ Ukrainian refugees, and the subsidy has to be spent on the housing costs of the new Ukrainian recruits.

**The employment impact of wage subsidies** in Hungary has been evaluated a number of times. Most of these evaluations focus on a specific target group and a limited period (i.e., a few years). The most recent evaluation (Krekó et al., 2021) aimed attention at NEETs under 25: they used propensity score matching techniques and compared participants of 90-day job trial programmes (treatment group) to public works scheme participants (control group). They found that 6 months after the programme, young people were 20-37% more likely to be in (unsubsidised) employment if they had participated in the job trial programme compared with the participants of public works schemes. Impacts were stronger for those with a low level of educational attainment. However, the authors could not rule out selection on unobservables: it is very likely that those who were selected into the programme were more employable (for example, were more skilled, self-confident, had better health etc.) even before the programme, since selection on observables (educational attainment and previous work experience) was also prevalent. The authors suggest that the wage subsidy programme most probably had large deadweight losses, and it could not reach the most disadvantaged and vulnerable groups.

Another evaluation (Strategopolis, 2018) concluded that wage subsidies were more effective in case of older jobseekers, and only subsidies lasting at least 8-9 months yield lasting results.

Based on the evaluations cited above, wage subsidies can provide effective tools for enhancing employability in Hungary. However, cream-skimming is a major problem: it is usually the more employable (more educated, more experienced, living in less disadvantaged regions etc.) who receive

the subsidy. This results in large deadweight losses and equity problems: the most vulnerable jobseekers (who need help the most) rarely receive wage subsidies.

## 5.2 Social security policies

Although not explicitly targeted to (25+) NEETs, the **Job Protection Action Plan (JPAP)** offers reductions in social security contributions for disadvantaged jobseekers, including young people below 25, long-term unemployed, mothers of young children and those working in low-skilled jobs (and also for people above 55 years of age). The JPAP was introduced in 2013 via the Act CXLVI. of 2012 on the Job Protection Action Plan. It was extended to workers in the agricultural sector in June 2015.

The main goal of the policy is to promote employment among some specific disadvantaged groups in the labour market through the reduction of social security contributions (SSC). After employees who are **under 25 years of age** and are not new entrants to the labour market, the SSC is 14% instead of the usual 28.5%. If the employee is a new entrant to the labour market (i.e., has less than 180 days of previous work experience), the employer is exempt from paying the SSC for two years (after that, it pays 14% if the employee is still below 25 years of age).

Concerning **young mothers returning from parental leave**, the SSC is 0% for the first two years and 14% for the third year. The same applies to new employees who had been long-term unemployed at the time of application.

For **unskilled workers** (those whose job does not require a vocational or a secondary degree) and, since 2015, for some specific jobs **in the agricultural sector**, the SSC is 14% for an unlimited period.

Svraka (2019; 2020) used administrative micro data (2010-2015) and applied a difference-in-differences estimator to estimate the employment effects of the Job Protection Action Plan. He found a robust and significant effect of around 1.2 percentage points three years after the introduction, though the impacts showed heterogeneity across the target groups. The largest impacts occurred among youth below 25: employment increased by 2.6 percentage points. In the low-skilled group, the increase in employment was 2.2 percentage points, and among long-term unemployed, it was 0.8 percentage points (estimation in the case of young mothers was not possible due to data limitations). The results suggest that the policy led to some substitution between eligible and non-eligible low-skilled workers, but the overall substitution effect was not large; no substitution effects were found for workers aged 26-30. Based on the author's calculations, the policy was cost-effective: the additional tax inflow based on increased employment exceeded the amount missing due to the reduction of SSC.

Based on economic theory, substitution between eligible and non-eligible workers (in this case, those just below 25 and those just above 25 years old) is always a danger in case of targeted subsidies;

however, Svraka (2019; 2020) did not find any substitution effects. His estimations only covered the period 2013-2015, though; we do not have information on how the policy performed in later years (including the years of the COVID-19 crisis).

### 5.3 Taxes

As of January 1, 2022, young workers below 25 years of age are exempt from personal income tax (which is 15% for those above 25). Reductions in personal income tax are available for parents of children under 18, regardless of the age of the parent. If the employee has one child, the amount of the tax reduction is HUF 120,000 (approx. EUR 339) annually. For parents of two children, the total annual amount is HUF 480,000 (EUR 1,356; HUF 240,000/EUR 678 per child). For parents of three or more children, the annual amount is HUF 396,000 (EUR 1,119) per child.

## 6. Orientation

---

**Labour market services** for registered jobseekers are regulated by the 100/2021. (II. 27.) and 311/2021 (VI. 7.) Government Decrees. Although some of the services (e.g., career guidance) mainly target young jobseekers, usually, there is no age limit in eligibility and all jobseekers can be referred to any of the services.

There are various types of services, each with a slightly different focus:

- job placement;
- information on available jobs, trainings or other measures, local labour market trends (in group or individually);
- counselling (in group or individually):
  - career guidance,
  - occupational guidance,
  - job search assistance,
  - psychological guidance,
  - rehabilitation counselling (for disabled jobseekers);
- mentoring.

Labour market services are usually part of large-scale (ESF-funded) ALMPs. They are either delivered by the National Employment Service or are (as is usually the case) outsourced to NGOs. The duration of services varies by type of service. Most individual counselling services consist of 3-6 sessions, while group sessions last for 1-5 days with 5-7 lessons a day. The length of mentoring is tailored to the client's needs.

Based on reports on the operations of the National Employment Service (Bördős et al., 2018; Bördős & Petróczi, 2019), there is a burning need for various labour market services in most local jobcentres: as caseworkers described, many jobseekers are uncertain about what they really want or should do in order to find a suitable job, especially among the youth. The availability of the services, however, is not always sufficient, not even with the launch of the GINOP 5.1.5<sup>10</sup> in 2018. As one of the reports cited above states: *‘Labour market services (mainly individual counselling) are not sufficiently available in every jobcentre. Due to lack of time, counselling usually does not take place during the standard client management procedure. Full-time counsellors hired by the county offices can only accept a low number of clients in some counties. The outsourcing of services is sometimes stalled by the bureaucracy of public procurement procedures.’* (Bördős et al., 2018, p. 11)

## 7. Conclusions

---

Having delved into the various fields of public policy in Hungary, we can conclude that NEETs aged between 25-29 are rarely an explicit target group of policies. However, there are plenty of policies that can potentially affect this cohort – employment policy (including regulations concerning tax and social security contributions and other hiring incentives for employers), VET & higher education policies and family policy are the most relevant fields of intervention. The results of some impact evaluations suggest that certain active labour market policies (such as training programmes and wage subsidies) can be effective tools for enhancing the employability of (25+) NEETs (though they are not devoid of weaknesses); with the extension of the reinforced Youth Guarantee Programme to 25-29-year-old NEETs in 2022, a higher focus can be expected to be laid on this cohort as well. Education policy is mostly relevant to the future generations of 25+ NEETs. With recent reforms in this field, it is hard to ex-ante assess the potential impact of education policy on the situation of (future) youth, although there are heavy critiques about the public education system in Hungary that mostly concern the equity of education and the quality of trainings in lower-secondary vocational schools. Although there are some policies that aim to ameliorate the situation of disadvantaged youth, it is generally considered by experts that more attention should be paid to vulnerable groups: for example, a more adequate social policy (as opposed to public works schemes being the only available tool) could complement the employment policy measures to help the long-term integration of disadvantaged groups into the primary labour market. Expanding the capacities of nurseries could also improve the (re-)employment prospects of women with young children. Finally, disability policy can be praised for its intentions to re-activate those

---

<sup>10</sup> The GINOP 5.1.5 (Supporting Labour Market Service Delivery by Non-governmental Organisations) was a programme where various kinds of services (e.g., career guidance, trainings on job search techniques, counselling etc.) were outsourced to NGOs.

who might be capable of work after rehabilitation, although assessments for disability status are considered unnecessarily strict by some experts.

## 8. References

---

Adamecz-Völgyi, A., Csillag, M., & Scharle, Á. (2018). Might Training Programmes Ease Labour Shortage? The Targeting and Effectiveness of Training Programmes Organised or Financed by Local Employment Offices of the Hungarian Public Employment Service. In K. Fazekas & J. Köllő (Eds.), *The Hungarian Labour Market 2017* (p. 11). Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.

Aue, R., Bach, M., Heigle, J., Klein, T., Pfeiffer, F., & Zapp, K. (2020). *The implication of school admission rules for segregation and educational inequality: Research report* [Research Report]. ZEW-Gutachten und Forschungsberichte. <https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/223254>

Bakó, T., Cseres-Gergely, Z., Kálmán, J., Molnár, G., & Szabó, T. (2014). *A munkaerőpiac peremén lévők és a költségvetés*. MTA Közgazdaság- és Regionális Tudományi Kutatóközpont, Közgazdaságtudományi Intézet.

<http://www.parlament.hu/documents/126660/133966/MTA+KRTK+KTI+A+munkaer%C5%91piac+pere m%C3%A9n+l%C3%A9v%C5%91k+%C3%A9s+a+k%C3%B6lts%C3%A9gv%C3%A9t%C3%A9s+jav%C3%ADtott.pdf/ba01c982-873e-416c-8b7f-c6684fe55db8>

Bakó, T., & Molnár, G. (2016). *A közfoglalkoztatás hatása a munkapiaci helyzetre* (A 2015-2016. Évi Munkaerőpiaci Helyzet És a Folyamatok Várható Alakulása, Hatása a Növekedésre És Az Államháztartásra). MTA KRTK KTI.

Bihari I. (2021). *A hátrányos helyzetű tanulók nem-kognitív készségeinek fejlődése a tanodában* [PhD Dissertation]. University of Debrecen, Doctoral School for Human Sciences, Programme for Sociology and Social Policy.

Bördös, K., Adamecz-Völgyi, A., & Békés, J. (2018). *A Nemzeti Foglalkoztatási Szolgálat ügyfélkategorizálási rendszerének értékelése* („A Profiling Rendszer Hatékonyságával Kapcsolatos Statisztikai És Módszertani Értékelés” Című Projekt Értékelő Tanulmánya). Hétfa Kutatóintézet. [http://hetfa.hu/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/HETFA\\_NGM\\_Profiling\\_ertekeles.pdf](http://hetfa.hu/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/HETFA_NGM_Profiling_ertekeles.pdf)

Bördös K., & Petróczi A. (2019). *A tartós munkanélküliek, valamint az 50 év feletti és a fiatal álláskeresők munkaerőpiaci integrációjának lehetőségei* [Improving the employability of the long-term unemployed, jobseekers above 50 and youth in Hungary]. Hétfa Research Institute. [https://hetfa.hu/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/HETFA\\_zarotanutmany\\_FINAL\\_20190830.pdf](https://hetfa.hu/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/HETFA_zarotanutmany_FINAL_20190830.pdf)

Csillag, M., Molnár, T., & Scharle, Á. (2020). *Do the Public Employment Services reach non-employed youths?* (Youth Employment PartnerSHIP, p. 20). Budapest Institute for Policy Analysis. <http://yepartnership.ibs.org.pl/p/do-the-public-employment-services-reach-non-employed-youths>

European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice. (2020). *Equity in School Education in Europe: Structures, Policies and Student Performance*. Eurydice Report. Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency, European Commission.

- Hermann, Z. (2020a). The impact of decreasing compulsory school-leaving age on dropping out of school. In K. Fazekas, M. Csillag, Z. Hermann, & Á. Scharle (Eds.), *The Hungarian Labour Market 2019* (p. 8). Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
- Hermann, Z. (2020b). The impact of school tracks on student performance in upper-secondary education. In K. Fazekas, M. Csillag, Z. Hermann, & Á. Scharle (Eds.), *The Hungarian Labour Market 2019* (p. 6). Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
- Hermann, Z., Horn, D., & Tordai, D. (2020). The effect of the 2013 vocational education reform on student achievement. In K. Fazekas, M. Csillag, Z. Hermann, & Á. Scharle (Eds.), *The Hungarian Labour Market 2019* (p. 6). Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
- Horn, D., Keller, T., & Róbert, P. (2016). Early tracking and competition – A recipe for major inequalities in Hungary. In H.-P. Blossfeld, S. Buchholz, J. Skopek, & M. Triventi, *Models of Secondary Education and Social Inequality* (pp. 129–148). Edward Elgar Publishing.  
<https://doi.org/10.4337/9781785367267.00017>
- Kertesi G., & Kézdi G. (2014). *Iskolai szegregáció, szabad iskolaválasztás és helyi oktatáspolitikai 100 magyar városban* (No. 2014/6; Budapest Working Papers On The Labour Market, p. 45). Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
- Köllő, J. (2018). Vocational training. In K. Fazekas & J. Köllő (Eds.), *The Hungarian Labour Market 2017* (p. 9). Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
- Koltai L., Bördős K., Csoba J., Herczeg B., Hamza E., Megyesi B., Németh N., Rácz K., Szabó D., Váradi M., Varga E., & Virág T. (2018). *A közfoglalkoztatás hatása a helyi gazdaságra, helyi társadalomra* (p. 308). HETFA Research Institute.  
[https://kozfoglalkoztataskormany.hu/download/f/fc/42000/BM\\_k%C3%B6zfoglalkoztat%C3%A1s\\_Tanulm%C3%A1ny\\_20180928-merged.pdf](https://kozfoglalkoztataskormany.hu/download/f/fc/42000/BM_k%C3%B6zfoglalkoztat%C3%A1s_Tanulm%C3%A1ny_20180928-merged.pdf)
- Kovács, K. (2016). *Equal Access to Quality Education of Roma Children in Hungary: Strategic Litigation as Tool for Social Change* [Central European University]. [http://hetfa.hu/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/hfpm\\_web.pdf](http://hetfa.hu/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/hfpm_web.pdf)
- Krekó, J., Csillag, M., Munkácsy, B., & Scharle, Á. (2021). *Can a short-term job trial programme kick-start young jobseekers' career?* (Youth Employment Partnership, p. 78). Budapest Institute for Policy Analysis.  
<http://yepartnership.ibs.org.pl/p/can-a-short-term-job-trial-programme-kick-start-young-jobseekers-career>
- Krekó, J., & Scharle, Á. (2021a). Changes in disability benefits and their impacts. In K. Fazekas, P. Elek, & T. Hajdu (Eds.), *The Hungarian Labour Market 2020* (p. 11). Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.



- Krekó, J., & Scharle, Á. (2021b). The disability employment quota and the rehabilitation contribution. In K. Fazekas, P. Elek, & T. Hajdu (Eds.), *The Hungarian Labour Market 2020* (p. 2). Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
- KSH. (2020a). *A kisgyermek napközbeni ellátása, 2020 [Day-care of young children, 2020]*. Hungarian Central Statistical Office.  
<https://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xftp/stattukor/kisgyermnapkozbeni/2020/index.html>
- KSH. (2020b). *Gyermekek óvodai és bölcsődei elhelyezési lehetősége*. <https://www.ksh.hu/ffi/2-5.html>
- Molnár G. (2020). Youth in public employment, with particular emphasis on early secondary school leavers. In Fazekas K., Csillag M., Hermann Z., & Scharle Á. (Eds.), *The Hungarian Labour Market 2019* (p. 6). Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
- Papp, Z. A. (2021). Roma népesség és oktatástervezés. *Educatio*, 30(2), 242–259.
- Radó, P. (2020). *Social Selection in Education: The Wider Context of the Segregation of Roma Pupils in Hungary* (No. 4; CPS Working Papers, p. 25). CEU Center for Policy Studies.
- Sánta T. (2016). Fiatal közmunkások egyik lehetséges jövőképe(?) avagy: A magyar JWT. *Metszetek*, 5. <http://metszetek.unideb.hu/>
- Strategopolis. (2018). *Aktív munkaerőpiaci eszközök eredményességének értékelése—Hatásosság, eredmények, javítási lehetőségek: Nemzetközi szakirodalom, hazai eszközök hatásvizsgálata és a rendszer értékelése alapján*. Draft.
- Svraka, A. (2019). The Effect of Labour Cost Reduction on Employment of Vulnerable Groups. *Public Finance Quarterly*, 64(1), 72–92.
- Svraka, A. (2020). The Effect of the Job Protection Action Plan. In K. Fazekas, M. Csillag, Z. Hermann, & Á. Scharle (Eds.), *The Hungarian Labour Market 2019* (p. 2). Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
- Szabó-Morvai, Á. (2013). *Who Benefits from Child Benefits? The Labor Supply Effects of Maternal Cash Benefit* (p. 31). HETFA Research Institute.
- World Bank. (2015). *Hungary: Skilling up the next generation. An analysis of Hungary's performance in the Program for International Student Assessment*. World Bank.  
<https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/340561468196449667/pdf/101561-WP-P152132-Box393264B-PUBLIC-PISA-Hungary.pdf>
- World Bank. (2018). *Technical Report Including Policy Recommendations for Improved Labor Market Intervention*.